IR Monitor – 10 June 2026

In this week’s newsletter:

The stories that investor relations professionals need to read this week:

• Elon Musk’s SpaceX float shows why ‘one share, one vote’ matters insists The Times
• Talal Almoallem on IFRS 20: what IR teams should ask before investors do
• More disclosures, less clarity: ISS on the Scope 3 data quality challenge
• Increasing passive ownership: IR Impact asks what IROs can influence and whether it is worth the effort
• A short seller’s fraud conviction Is spooking Wall Street warns the WSJ: traders who bet on stock price declines worry prosecutors are equating their tactics with market manipulation
• And finally … most activist investors are not really activist investors according to the Financial Times

This week’s news

Elon Musk’s SpaceX float shows why ‘one share, one vote’ matters

SpaceX’s planned IPO has renewed concerns about the growing use of dual-class share structures that give founders outsized control despite holding a smaller economic stake. Writing in The Times, the Chair of Investor Coalition for Equal Votes (“ICEV”) Caroline Escott argues that the company’s proposed structure would leave Elon Musk with around 85% of voting power through super-voting shares, significantly limiting shareholders’ ability to influence corporate decisions after listing. This marks a departure from the long-established “one share, one vote” principle, which links voting rights to economic ownership and is widely viewed as a cornerstone of shareholder accountability. The concern extends beyond SpaceX, with other high-profile AI-led companies preparing to list, the debate around adopting structures that concentrate control among founders is set to intensify. ICEV points to research suggesting that any performance advantages associated with unequal voting rights tend to diminish over time from listing and may ultimately weigh on long-term performance. Several companies are compounding the problem through restrictive litigation provision that further limit shareholder recourse. For companies considering an IPO, the discussion highlights how governance structures can become as important to investors as growth prospects, particularly when trust and accountability are central to the investment case. The ICEV’s broader warning for UK PLCs specifically relates to the temptation to relax governance standards in pursuit of high-profile listings – undermining the shareholder protections that define the quality of British capital markets.  

IFRS 20: what IR teams should ask before investors do

Companies operating under regulated business models may need to start preparing for investor questions about IFRS 20 long before the standard takes effect in 2029, argues Talal Almoallem, Senior Director in Investor Relations Advisory at FTI Consulting. In a LinkedIn article, Talal contends that the new accounting standard introduces a framework for recognising certain regulatory assets and liabilities that arise when there is a delay between providing regulated services and recovering the related amounts through customer charges. Importantly, operating in a regulated sector does not automatically bring a company into scope. Probing by investors will vary by company, however regulated industries, such as energy or infrastructure sectors, may face increased scrutiny as investors assess how the changes affect reported performance. Almoallem argues that IR teams should work with finance colleagues early to understand whether the standard applies, which activities could fall within scope and whether key measures such as EBITDA, operating profit, leverage ratios or other metrics may be affected. Non-GAAP measure and historical comparatives could also require revisiting. While IFRS 20 is not expected to alter overall cash generation, it could affect how financial results are presented and interpreted. The key challenge may therefore be ensuring that any accounting changes are clearly distinguished from the underlying economics of the business. Companies that develop a clear internal view early are likely to be better placed when investor questions begin to arrive. Whilst the standard is a few reporting cycles away, the investor questions are not.   

The Scope 3 data quality challenge

Scope 3 emissions disclosures are becoming more common, but the quality of the underlying data continues to raise concerns, according to analysis from ISS Insights. The number of companies reporting Scope 3 emissions increased from roughly 4,800 in 2020 to 7,700 in 2024, representing annual growth of more than 12%. However, around 2,500 companies had their reported figures rejected by ISS in 2024 and replaced with modelled estimates because of concerns over completeness, consistency or methodology. The most common issues include missing emissions categories, narrow reporting boundaries and inconsistent calculation approaches. Financial institutions remain a particular challenge, with many failing to disclose financed emissions, which often represent the vast majority of their climate footprint. ISS found that only 17% of financial companies in its database provided reliable data for this category in 2024. While rejection rates have fallen over time, significant regional and sector differences remain, with Europe generally showing stronger reporting quality than Asia and North America. The report argues that modelled emissions will continue to play an important role until reporting standards become more consistent. For IR professionals, particularly those in Financials, Energy and Industrials, where data rejection rates are highest, the findings are a practical prompt. Greater disclosure alone may not improve credibility if investors question what has been included, excluded or estimated. IROs should be prepared to explain their company’s reporting boundaries and methodology proactively to stakeholders. 

Increasing passive ownership: what IROs can influence and why

London Stock Exchange Group data recently showed that across UK equities, active funds shed £9.4bn whilst passive funds gained £5bn over the past year. This structural shift is not a temporary anomaly, it is reshaping how companies must think about investor engagement. Getech’s IRO Irina Longutenkova offers insights for IR Impact on what IROs can proactively do in response. Firstly ‘passive ownership’ should not connote a docile group of investors since they do vote at AGMs and their stewardship influence is growing. Proactive steps should be made to engage with not only the portfolio managers, but also governance and stewardship teams of index funds well ahead of AGM’s. Corporate governance roadshows are one underutilised tactic for doing this effectively. For companies seeking to actively increase passive ownership, a long-term strategy is required. This three-to-five-year commitment begins with mapping index eligibility, which vary significantly across regimes and can be difficult to interpret. Corporate actions such as secondary listings, re-domiciliation, free-float adjustments or even hiring a market maker can all influence passive fun inclusion and each carries trade-off that IROs should understand before making the case internally. IROs should have a firm grasp of the risk-reward dynamic: index exclusion can be swift and damaging and furthermore share price movements may increasingly reflect mechanical flows rather than company fundamentals. That said, the scale of index funds comprising over 60% of US domestic equity mutual funds and ETF assets, means ignoring this investor class is becoming increasingly difficult to justify.  

A short seller’s fraud conviction Is spooking Wall Street

The conviction of Andrew Left, founder of Citron Research, on securities fraud charges is sending a chill through activist short-selling circles, with Wall Street now questioning how freely investors can voice opinions on stocks without attracting legal scrutiny. The WSJ reports that a federal jury found that Left had manipulated markets by publicly declaring positions on social media and building a large following in the process, all while simultaneously trading in the opposite direction, sometimes within minutes of posting. Prosecutors extended the theory beyond short positions, securing convictions on charges related to long positions in stocks including Nvidia, where Left encouraged others to buy before quickly exiting once prices rose. The verdict is notable for what it did not allege: Left was not accused of making overtly false statements, but rather of using truthful commentary with manipulative intent, a legal theory his lawyers argue conflicts with First Amendment protections and established Supreme Court precedent. The ruling lands at a difficult moment for activist short sellers, a group already in structural decline; the number of firms publishing short-selling research has fallen from 55 in 2020 to 31 so far in 2026, according to Breakout Point. For IROs, the case is a reminder that the relationship between public commentary and trading behaviour is under increasing regulatory scrutiny and that the line between legitimate market opinion and manipulation may be drawn more narrowly than many assumed.

And finally … most activist investors are not really activist investors

For many investors, it will come as little surprise that the term “activist investor” is something of a misnomer. JPMorgan’s EMEA Sustainable Investing Research team has now put hard numbers to what seasoned market watchers have long suspected that the majority of so-called activist investors are, in practice, anything but. FT Alphaville spotlighted the data – by analysing campaigns between 2018 and 2026, JPMorgan found that 70% of activists participated in just one campaign over the period, with 82% involved in no more than two. Only 4% ran 10 or more campaigns and it is this small cohort that generates the real returns, delivering 9% positive alpha over their less prolific counterparts across one- and two-year horizons. The research also challenges some widely held assumptions about what activist success actually looks like. Board seat gains, often treated as the headline measure of victory, produce no statistically significant alpha, while CEO changes and strategic reviews, despite counting as wins on paper, are associated with meaningful negative alpha over one to two years. The best outcome for target company shareholders, it turns out, is improved capital returns, followed by a company sale. Perhaps most tellingly, non-core activists tend to secure just enough concessions to be shown the door, with dividend improvements typically reversed by year two. For IROs, the practical takeaway is clear: not all activists warrant the same level of concern. Understanding whether an incoming shareholder is a seasoned repeat player or a one-campaign opportunist could meaningfully shape how a company chooses to engage.