FTI Consulting UK Public Affairs Snapshot: What Trump’s return means for Britain and the Special Relationship

Transatlantic relations between Britain and the US are exceptionally close, shaped by a “Special Relationship” of shared history, extensive diplomatic and military cooperation and a marriage of democratic ideals and values. Yet, the return of President Trump to the White House presents a test of endurance for this old alliance, including across key areas of security, trade and economic policy.

Ideological differences mark the most apparent point of divide between the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, and the President-elect, which may present initial diplomatic obstacles for the British government. Trump has privately expressed a degree of animosity towards Starmer, describing him as “very left-wing”. Last month, the Trump campaign also filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), accusing the Labour Party of “blatant foreign interference”.

However, recent history tells us that the Special Relationship is perfectly able to accommodate political divides; one of the closest partnerships in recent times was that of Tony Blair and George W Bush, despite the ideological differences which existed between the Labour prime minister and Republican president.

The hard reality for Britain is that, in an imbalanced partnership, the Special Relationship is exponentially more important to London than it is to Washington. The British government is therefore working at pace to move off the back foot with Trump, even ahead of his inauguration in January. However, the litany of pejorative comments about the once former, now future President expressed by several Labour MPs who are now ministers in government is hardly helpful to these efforts.

But the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy – himself among those to have expressed stinging criticism – have worked to cultivate positive ties with Trump’s top team in recent months. Starmer was also quick to congratulate Trump on a “historic election victory” and affirmed that the Special Relationship will “continue to prosper on both sides of the Atlantic for years to come”.

The nature of Trump’s relationships with Theresa May and Boris Johnson, who were in office during his first term, also provides some hope. It showed that space could be cultivated for careful disagreement, allowing Britain’s leadership to stage manage relations with the Trump administration, while remaining cognisant of the broad antipathy felt towards Trump by a majority of the British public.

Trump’s scepticism of trade liberalisation, his position on climate change and his commentary on domestic British affairs, for instance, prompted angst and frustration in London when the British and Americans did not see eye-to-eye. Likewise, on foreign policy, security in Europe could emerge as a significant point of contention for the relationship. Should a Trump presidency follow through with threats to cut funding for Ukraine in its war with Russia, Britain and its European allies would either need to accept an ensuing Russian victory or step up to plug the gap of Ukraine’s top financial backer.

Discussions of which nations would carry that economic burden would likely heighten scrutiny of NATO members’ own defence spending and prompt further speculation about the US’ ongoing membership of the once unshakable Western alliance – one that remains the fundamental core of Britain’s defence posture. This, as well as Trump’s mixed messaging regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin, will sow further uncertainty regarding the strength of a united transatlantic front. However, Trump’s allies would challenge this, noting that as President, he took the decision to impose unprecedented sanctions on Russia.

Shifts in US trade policy could also exacerbate economic strains. Trump has pledged to impose a flat tariff of up to 20% on imports, following through on the economically nationalist tone of his campaign. For a Labour government seeking to expand export opportunities for British businesses and strengthen its international trade connections, this economic insularity presents a clear challenge.

The Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has affirmed that Britain will not be a “passive actor” in the face of potential economic obstacles with the US, while the Business and Trade Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, has stated that trade officials are “extremely well prepared” for every potential outcome from the election. However, Britain will inevitably face a more economically insular and protectionist US administration than that of President Biden, and it will have to consider carefully its position amid the backdrop of geopolitical and national security tensions with China.

The prospect of a future UK-US trade deal, however, presents an opportunity for progress. This is something for which Trump showed significant appetite while in office, and something on which the previous Conservative government in Britain worked enthusiastically with his administration. A final realisation of a comprehensive agreement, though, would hinge on the new administration’s immediate strategic priorities once cabinet appointments are made, and on careful alignment with a more cautious British government and its anticipated red lines on areas such as healthcare and food standards.

Indeed, as much as the President-elect may have a personal affinity for Britain – the Royal Family and Scotland in particular – that will not detract from the US’ ruthless pursuit of its own national interest, nor would any deal be viable unless it was viewed as compatible with Trump’s “America First” approach. This would be in addition to considerations around the political dynamics of the newly elected US Congress, which will create challenges for any US trade agreement, given the rise of economic populism and influence of labour unions.

More nuanced diplomatic challenges may arise in differing transatlantic policy approaches to China. Trump perceives China as a significant threat to US economic growth and may criticise Western countries that seek to build more cooperative relationships with the regime. At a time when the new Labour government is pushing to reset Britain’s relationship with Beijing to allow for more engagement on global issues, Britain may find itself taking a different position on trade with China but also on its approach more generally.

Indeed, the leader of Reform UK, Nigel Farage, a close friend of Donald Trump, has urged the President-elect to reverse the Biden administration’s support for the British decision to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. The Chagos archipelago, which includes the strategically important island of Diego Garcia, hosts a joint US-UK military base that helps to project Western power across the Indo-Pacific, Middle East and east Africa.

Despite the agreement stipulating that the base will remain operational for an “initial period” of 99 years, the deal has raised significant concerns within Trump’s inner circle and among senior Republicans, who fear that the transfer of sovereignty would give China a geopolitical advantage. This may prompt a shift in US policy before Britain has the chance to sign any formal treaty.

Just how “special” the transatlantic relationship will remain overall will ultimately depend on Britain’s ability to maintain close diplomatic ties with its strongest ally while navigating inevitable policy disagreements with a more unpredictable Washington. While the British government may not always agree with Trump on ideological grounds, the real test for the Prime Minister will be the degree of pragmatism his government employs to support, maintain and strengthen historically robust ties. Judging by Starmer’s initial response to Trump’s victory, Britain’s commitment to such a course of action remains in tact.