The centrality of state-owned energy companies to the Mexican President’s politics suggests that these dynamics are unlikely to change during the remainder of his term. More- over, the electoral roadmap on both sides of the border will likely reinforce politically-expedient government positions as opposed to technically sound alternatives. Every 12 years, the presidential election cycles of Mexico and the U.S. overlap, as will be the case in 2024. Both countries are already barreling toward highly competitive contests, if not outright conten- tious ones.

In Mexico, the government is working to weaken²¹ indepen- dent electoral bodies. Key local elections will be held in June 2023, and President López Obrador hopes to have an agree- ment within his party shortly thereafter on who will seek to succeed him.²² In the U.S., potential candidates are already being encouraged²³ to test the waters and are preparing to fundraise²⁴ with an eye on the months-long primary process that is only a year away.

Should one or more of the current disputes under the USMCA lead to the establishment of a panel — as is increasingly ex- pected — campaigns will be underway in all but name by the time an arbitral decision is delivered. Elections on both sides of the border are bound to be perceived as choices between continuity and change, making sitting governments more likely to double down on challenged policies than to quickly retreat from them, even if their positions are unlikely to pre- vail in international arbitration.

If this comes to pass, the private sector will have to keep working hard to identify and expand business opportunities. Companies have succeeded in doing so — projects continue to be announced. For all the talk of doomsday scenarios, President López Obrador continues to speak²⁵ of strength- ening ties with the U.S., even while missing opportunities to do so. As for participants in troubled sectors, such as energy, they will require robust value defense strategies that are likely to include further legal action.