FTI Consulting Global Public Affairs Snapshot – Politics remains King: The NATO Washington Summit 2024

NATO’s keystone annual Summit is the Alliance’s most visible expression of transatlantic solidarity. In some ways, it has never looked more robust than it did in Washington DC this week. Two new members – Finland and Sweden – have acceded in a little over 12 months. European defense spending is once again accelerating alongside unshakable commitments to the enduring defense of Ukraine and a new Secretary General, Mark Rutte, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, stands ready to be installed. 

Yet concerns over the enduring commitment to NATO from its most important partner, the United States, hung like a dark cloud over proceedings. The prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected in November promises the reopening of fissures in that solidarity, certainly rhetorical if not actual. It is a prospect made darker by the advancing electoral success of the populist right across Europe, invariably coupled to an increasingly isolationist world view.

Indeed, it is the backdrop of the upcoming US Presidential election that was the week’s biggest story. Democratic party insiders had hoped that the Summit would provide enough opportunities for President Joe Biden to prove his vitality not only to the assembled foreign leaders, but to American voters and key Democratic lawmakers following his June debate performance against presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump.

NATO leaders continue to reiterate their commitment to the Alliance in this light. Inevitably, they each publicly voiced the need to work with whichever administration is in the White House after January 2025 to defend the Alliance and its members – including the Democrat incumbents. But emphasis on the continued need to support Ukraine and, by extension European security overall, belied the urgency of “Trump-proofing” NATO from the potential victor’s anticipated bellicosity.

Trump, who currently leads Biden in most national and battleground state polls, has continued to vocalize his skepticism of the Ukraine endeavor and the Alliance in its entirety. It came as no surprise, then, that Biden’s 15-minute speech focused heavily on a plan to supply new air defense systems to Ukraine and his country’s ironclad commitment to Kyiv.

To Biden’s misfortune, however, US audiences were primarily concerned with the performative angle of the President’s participation in the Summit and its implications for November. His feisty closing press conference may have assuaged some doubters, were it not for mixing up the names of President Zelenskyy with President Putin and Vice-President Harris with Donald Trump. 

Across the pond, the resounding victory of Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour Party in the UK General Election last week has perhaps offered a beacon of stability among the uncertain political developments of other major Alliance players.

The new Prime Minister’s Party, entirely to his own credit, is no longer defined by a conspiratorial view of the importance of NATO to European security, as it was under his left-wing predecessor Jeremy Corbyn. Now, Starmer’s Labour has an “unshakeable commitment” to the Alliance, with new Foreign Secretary David Lammy and new Defense Secretary John Healey this week confirming that the UK Government will apply a “NATO first” approach to its upcoming strategic defense review, which will be set in motion next week.

This is to be met with a simultaneous pursuit of a UK-EU Security Pact, which the collective UK defense industry will be hoping includes arrangements for the country’s potential participation in EU defense initiatives, thus allowing the UK, at institutional and industrial level, to access both those and NATO capability development programs. Starmer’s comments at the Summit that such a deal should be complementary with NATO is also a welcome sign that duplication is a recognized risk to be avoided, even if its success at the technical level remains to be seen.

However, for all of the signposting that the occupant of No.10 Downing Street has made at the Summit, Starmer has come under fire at home for his refusal to place a timestamp on his target of increasing defense spending to the equivalent of 2.5% of GDP, opting instead to reaffirm his election manifesto commitment that he will do so only “when economic conditions allow.”

While this could have afforded the Prime Minister the opportunity to galvanize his urging of other Allies to meet the same target spend, downplay pressure from UK military commentators and the likely pressure to grow defense spending in the event of another Trump administration, to do so would have contradicted his administration’s prioritization of fiscal responsibility above all else.

Nevertheless, confirmation that the government’s strategic defense review will be kicked off next week allows Starmer the space to determine what is needed, when it is needed by and to set a date for reaching the 2.5% target – presumably published alongside a comprehensive spending profile for achieving it.

While defense commentators and military chiefs will persist in their critique of Starmer’s prudent approach to increasing budgets, Labour can – for the time being at least – credibly point the finger of blame on their inheritance from the last government in avoiding allegations of neglect. This is something the government will double down on as it attempts to make affordable decisions over unaffordable overpromises.

In any case, the UK looks set to be far more stable politically than its closest geographic ally, France.

The recent gamble taken by President Emanuel Macron to call snap Parliamentary elections resulted in far-right National Rally winning the first round of votes, only to be supplanted by the coalition of far-left parties under the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP). Macron’s Ensemble came in at second place, though no party won the 289 seats required for a majority.

With no outright winner, France now faces the challenge of forming a coalition government with an NFP candidate as Prime Minister. The subject of NATO, and French defense policy more widely, could initiate an immediate civil war within the coalition and simultaneously set the new government on a collision course with the Elysée.

As recently as 2022, La France Insoumise, the NFP’s largest party, argued that France’s membership of NATO be put to a vote in Parliament and has, along with the Communist Party, opposed the concept of a broader European defense policy, favoring an independent French policy instead – an idea also supported by the now 142-seat-strong National Rally. The NFP’s other members, the Socialists and the Greens, are staunchly opposed to both of these positions, in line with the Elysée.

Though defense and foreign policy remains the prerogative of Macron, any attempt to respond to the outcomes of the Summit – budgetary or political – will be at the mercy of a potentially skeptical Parliament and split coalition government.

That said, equipment and military support for Ukraine looks set to continue, having been included in the NFP’s program ahead of the election, and any caretaker administration formed while a coalition is agreed would remain aligned with that of the President.

Additional support for Ukraine in the likelihood of another Trump Presidency was at the forefront of Germany’s attendance at the Summit.

As the second largest bilateral spending in Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz is particularly concerned about a reduction in US presence under a Trump administration, something that would inevitably have to be compensated for by Europe.

While Germany has heavily increased its defense spending since the Russian invasion, including its €100 million “Zeitenwende”, and increased its NATO troop deployments, growing budgetary pressures and political fallout have brought into question whether Berlin’s financial commitments for defense now will be sustainable in future, irrespective of who sits in the White House. A Trump administration, bringing with it calls for more NATO funding from Europe, could present an uncomfortable environment on the world stage and domestically.

This would have significant consequences for Germany’s future capability development and is perhaps one of the core reasons behind Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ plea that NATO prioritize the coordination of national defense industry strategies in order to close critical capability gaps and foment joint armament production.

With Federal Elections due in 2025 – indicating defeat for Scholz’s Social Democrats – the current Federal Government has little time to mend its standing in the polls, much less the preparedness of its defense industrial complex.

In a departure from the focus on Ukraine, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez travelled to this week’s Summit to remind the Alliance of other security threats, such as in the Sahel and Maghreb, and the continued threat of terrorism.

Sánchez’s approach is, like all Alliance members, political. In addition to an historic disinterest in NATO Summits by the Spanish public, the Prime Minister also must weigh up the presence of the far-left Sumar electoral alliance within his government coalition.

Sumar’s opposition to an increased military budget this year despite the geopolitical context left Spain among just three NATO members which spent less on defense capabilities in 2023 and, once again, it will fail to meet the 2% spending target this year.

Yet this does not mean that Ukraine is unimportant to Madrid. Indeed, the Spanish defense industry continues to benefit from the overall increases to military spending across NATO despite the comparatively slow growth in Spain’s domestic budget. In 2022 alone, the Spanish defense industry’s turnover grew almost 5% compared to the previous year, to over €12 billion.

Therefore, while Spain’s public agenda at the Summit has been relatively toned down, its defense industry will be closely attuned to future support for Ukraine, particularly as a recent bilateral agreement between Madrid and Kyiv agreed to supply over €1 billion of freshly produced equipment rather than from the existing stockpiles of Spain’s Armed Forces.

The defense ambitions of France, Germany and Spain following the Summit will also be contingent upon the future direction of the EU. Like many EU member states, Brussels too is aware of the impact that a new Trump administration could have on NATO and European defense.

The publication of the 2024 European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and its associated programs, therefore, held a base assumption that the EU could no longer afford to be over-reliant on US capabilities. Thus, the pursuit of EU Strategic Autonomy and expansion of its defense industrial capacity is to be prioritized.

While questions remain over the feasibility of EDIS given its small initial budget (€1.5 billion), continued preference by many EU member states for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) capabilities and current absence of any meaningful route for third country participation, its call to action should not be understated.

Hence why the results of the EU Parliamentary elections in early June caused concern across the bloc’s capitals, as support for the hard right surged alongside unease over the potential future of EU support for Ukraine and its role within Europe’s defense more widely.

These concerns are well founded, but many within Brussels found relative solace with the example of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, whom at first seemed like an impending troublemaker but who has since been brought into the pro-Ukraine, pro-NATO fold.

The desire for a more EU-centric approach, therefore, was delivered wholeheartedly in the speech by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, who made clear that it was a strategic responsibility. The EU’s defense ambitions, he said, were not intended as an alternative to NATO but rather a means to strengthen the Alliance and improve burden sharing.

How the EU intends to achieve this ambition at the policy and industrial levels without greater coordination with NATO programs and collaboration with non-EU NATO members, however, remains enigmatic.

For industry, while the Summit has culminated in positive signals in the form of a new Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and increased focus on cyber capabilities, delivery of these endeavors is as much about NATO’s ability as an organization to implement them as it is the domestic politics of its members. Progress on the landmark Defense Production Action Plan (DPAP) from last year’s Vilnius Summit is evidence as much.

Politics thus remains king in NATO. Pledges, speeches and declarations serve their purpose but often only as they are published or spoken in real-time.

As Alliance members are forced to navigate an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment and seek to stave off growing populism domestically, time is of the essence to tangibly achieve victory on the ground in Ukraine and consolidate NATO’s position as the world’s preeminent security alliance for the next 75 years. Failure could mean this being called into question as soon as the next annual Summit in the Netherlands in 2025.